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The Arnold s
of Southwest
Arkansas
102 YEARS OF LAW
In 1879, William Hendrick Ar-
nold, a seventeen-year-old school
teacher in Clark County, began in
earnest to read Blackstone and
other relevant legal matter as a
first step to becoming a lawyer. His
formal education had included at-
tendance at Ansley's Academy at
Artesian, a kind of preparatory
school that his father David Saxon
Arnold, a farmer, had helped es-
tablish; but the considerable
learning that he acquired thereaf-
ter was entirely by dint of indi-
vidual effort. David Saxon Arnold
had received a classical education
at Erskine College in South
Carolina in the 1840s before mov-
ing to Arkansas, but much formal
education for his family was made
impossible by the civil war and its
aftermath.
In 1862, David enlisted in the
confederate cause in El Dorado,
and he returned home in 1864 after
being discharged as a captain in
the Louisiana Cavalry. His wife
Temperance Lucinda Arnold,
speaking of his military commis-
sions, wrote: "I remember the old
papers with the seals, worn and
broken where they were folded.
They were such sad old relics, fu-
nereal in every respect. We never
By Morris S.
talked of them, and looking back
now it seems to me we laid it all
down and tried to forget all its hor-
rors. I do not know what became of
his sword."' During the war, the
family became refugees and set-
tled for a time in Miller County
near Garland City until the war
ended. After the war, of course,
there was very little in the way of
education available. William
Hendrick Arnold wrote that "we
never had any schooling in those
days other than for a few months in
the year at uncertain intervals.
Teachers could not be had as the
people were all very poor on ac-
count of the ravages of the civil
war. 
' 2
It would be some time after the
war ended before even normal
civil regulation, much less any-
thing resembling schools, could be
very firmly established. David Ar-
nold's cotton was sometimes sto-
len by the Union soldiers occupy-
ing South Arkansas. On one occa-
sion, William reports, "a caval-
cade of these officers came to our
house.. .and simply took posses-
sion. They had their own cook with
them, and the family, consisting of
my mother and us children, stayed
out of the house, and I never heard
"Buzz" Arnold
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such frying and cooking as went on
in our kitchen. I came very near
starving as these men had spent
the previous night with us, and
after they had gotten through eat-
ing their dinner which I remember
was cooked with so much noise
and sputtering, there was one bis-
cuit as large as a saucer left and I
made a grab for it, but my mother
seized me and told me not to touch
it. She thought it was a Yankee
biscuit, and threw it out."13
Why William turned to the law is
not altogether clear. Perhaps it
was because his paternal grand-
father Ira Arnold had been a trial
judge in South Carolina as had
others of his eighteenth-century
ancestors. Just as likely, it was be-
cause farming was not much to his
liking. Recalling the days when
his work at Ansley Academy had
been interrupted by farm duties,
he wrote that he "plowed up new
ground in which there were roots of
elm trees running all around on top
of the ground. I made some mar-
velous escapes and sometimes the
plow would strike a stump or root
and the handles would be thrust
against me, other times the roots
would fly back and strike my knees
and shins. I pursued this work with
I I
so much energy that one of my
knees swelled up for six weeks,
and while I was in bed I continued
my studies."' It was then, he said,
that he read "history, biographies
of great men, exploits of great
generals, especially Napoleon,
and had it in my mind that I pos-
sessed great military genius, and
resolved to be a general in war,
and a lawyer in time of
peace... These golden dreams
have recurred with less frequency
as the years have gone by, and I
have reached the conclusion that a
good, reliable citizen is worth
more to a country than some of
those who agitate and bring on
strife. '
William's ambition to become a
lawyer, however, was in fact
realized. In 1881 he took up the
study of law in the offices of War-
ren & Mitchell in Prescott. Like
most nineteenth-century legal ap-
prentices, he did not think very
highly of the tutelage that he re-
ceived. "With references to read-
ing law in the office of Messrs,
Warren and Mitchell," he wrote, "it
may be said that, so far as my
knowledge goes, students are, in
the main, always self-instructed,
the old lawyers seldom ask any
L to R: Sheppard Arnold, Thomas Saxon Arnold, Richard Lewis Arnold,
William Hendrick Arnold, Jr. (1893-1977), William Hendrick Arnold Il, and
Richard Sheppard Arnold. The picture in the back is of William Hendrick
Arnold (1861-1946).
questions of the students with re-
ference to books, and the conver-
sation seems to relate to practical
matters or incidents of the present
time and in detailing their own ex-
periences and successes, their fai-
lures never mentioned." Indeed,
he said that his mentors "were sel-
dom in the office."7 In 1882 he was
admitted to the bar and, after prac-
ticing a few months in Prescott, in
1883 he moved to Texarkana and
established an office.
He arrived in Texarkana, a town
barely ten years old, with fifteen
second-hand law books, a bed and
mattress, "a little old tin or zinc
trunk," and forty dollars in cash.'
He rented a small room from W. J.
Smithers, a justice of the peace, for
$2.50 a month. His circumstances
were something less than palatial:
"There were holes in the floor," he
recalled, "through which the rats,
large and small, ran back and
forth all the live long night. He also
claimed that "the dirt on the floor
and tobacco juice had ac-
cumulated and must have been
half an inch thick in places," but he
"slept securely in that old build-
ing, although one would not have
thought it very secure as there
were fires in Texarkana at that
time nearly every night, and
nearly everything in the town was
burnt up first and last except that
old building."'
As might be expected, it took
William some time to establish a
practice. He bagan his work in the
J. P. courts of Texarkana, and one
of his first cases was a suit against
one L. Samuel, a pawnbroker, for a
wash-pot. The claim was that the
pot was stolen from his client, but
the defendant's expert (a hardware
man) testified that "there were a
great many black pots in the world
of this size, and it was doubtful
whether you could identify one
from the other." On the basis of
their testimony the case went
against William and fifty years
later he could still feel the sting:
"The loss of the wash-pot case," he
wrote, "hurt my conscience very
much, and I thought that there was
no justice in law.""
William claimed that "he was
naturally shrinking and timid" and
therefore his "business was not
very extensive for a long time,"
especially since he did not "culti-
vate acquaintances" or "mix
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around with the business inter-
est."" In time, however, he pros-
pered, acquired a very large gen-
eral practice, and argued several
cases before the Supreme Court of
the United States. He also was evi-
dently able to overcome his pur-
ported shyness sufficiently to be
elected four times city recorder of
Texarkana (1885-88), mayor of
Texarkana (1892-94), and president
of the Texarkana School Board in
which capacity he served ten
years. In 1907 he was elected pres-
ident of the Arkansas Bar Associa-
tion. He also served as chairman of
the Miller County Democratic
Convention of 1917. In 1923 he at-
tended the organizational meeting
of the American Law Institute. In
1925 he was appointed special as-
sociate justice of the Supreme
Court of Arkansas and in 1929 was
elected special judge of the Eighth
Circuit of Arkansas by the bar of
that circuit to fill a vacancy.
William Hendrick Arnold's even-
tual success in the law, the prac-
tice of which he vigorously pur-
sued until his death in 1946, would
make it possible for his children to
enjoy educational advantages that
he had been denied. His first child,
]odie Claypool Arnold, attended
Randolph Macon Woman's Col-
lege and the Drexel Institute; Lucy
Arnold, his next child, received a
B.A. from Randolph Macon in 1911;
and Ruth Arnold, the third daugh-
ter, attended Vassar and the Uni-
versity of Chicago.
The sons, all of whom were to
become lawyers, were also outfit-
ted with the finest possible educa-
tions. William H. Arnold, Jr., the
eldest son, was born in 1893, was
graduated from Phillips Exeter
Academy in 1911, Harvard College
in 1915, and Oxford University in
1918. He attended Oxford as a
Rhodes Scholar and was a student
at the Inner Temple in London. He
was admitted to the Arkansas Bar
in 1916. He served in the Army in
France during World War I, and
was also a member of the Texas
and Louisiana bars. William, Jr.
was chairman of the Miller County
Democratic Central Committee
and was engaged in the general
practices of law in Texarkana until
his death on November 6, 1977.
David Christopher Arnold, Wil-
liam's second son, was born in
1896. He was graduated from Phil-
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lips Exeter Academy in 1913 and
attended the University of the
South. In 1918 he was admitted to
the bar of Arkansas. In 1920, at the
age of 24, he was elected to the
Arkansas House of Representa-
tives. In 1922 he was elected to the
Arkansas Senate by a majority of
two to one and served one four-
year term. He died in 1936 after
being stricken while trying a case
in Miller County.
Richard Lewis Arnold, William's
youngest son, was born in 1906. He
was graduated from Phillips Exe-
ter Academy in 1925, Yale College
in 1929, and Harvard Law School in
1932. He was admitted to the Ar-
kansas bar in 1931 and was for
many years a member of the Board
of Directors and General Counsel
of Southwestern Electric Power Co.
He twice served as special asso-
ciate justice of the Supreme Court
of Arkansas. He is presently living
in Texarkana.
William H. Arnold, Jr. had two
sons, both of whom became
lawyers. William Hendrick Ar-
nold, III was born in 1923. He at-
tended Rice University and re-
ceived a B.A. from the University of
Texas in 1948. In 1950 he was
graduated from the University of
Texas Law School and the same
year was admitted to the bar of
Texas. In 1953 he was admitted to
the bar of Arkansas and in 1966
was elected circuit judge of the
Eighth Judicial District of Arkan-
sas. He is presently engaged in the
practice of law in Texarkana in the
firm of Arnold and Arnold with his
brother Thomas Saxon Arnold.
Thomas was born in 1928 and was
graduated from Rice University in
1949 and the University of Texas
Law School in 1952. He was admit-
ted to the bar of Texas in 1952, the
bar of Arkansas in 1953, and the
bar of Colorado in 1977. For many
years he has had interests in vari-
ous title companies in the south-
western United States.
Richard Lewis Arnold's first son,
Richard Sheppard Arnold, was
born in 1936. He was graduated
from Phillips Exeter Academy in
1953, Yale College in 1957, where
he was first in his class, and Har-
vard Law School in 1960, where he
was again first in his class and
served as an editor of the Harvard
Law Review. In 1960 he was admit-
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ted to the Arkansas bar after hav-
ing made the highest score on the
bar examination given in July of
that year. In 1961 he was admitted
to the bar of the District of Colum-
bia. After a year's clerkship with
Mr. Justice Brennan of the Suprene
Court of the United States, he prac-
ticed for a time with the
Washington firm of Covington and
Burling before returning to Texar-
kana to join the family firm in 1964.
He was elected a delegate to the
Arkansas Constitutional Conven-
tion of 1969-70 and for a number of
years worked for Governor and
later Senator Dale Bumpers. In
1978 he was appointed a United
States district judge for the East-
ern and Western Districts of Ar-
kansas and in 1980 he was ele-
vated to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
where he presently sits. Judge Ar-
nold's wife, Kay Kelley Arnold, a
graduate of the University of Ar-
kansas and the UALR Law School,
was admitted to the Arkansas bar
in 1981. Morris Sheppard Arnold,
his brother, was born in 1941. He
was graduated from Phillips Exe-
ter Academy in 1959, attended Yale
College, and was graduated from
the University of Arkansas in 1965
and the University of Arkansas
Law School in 1968 where he was
Editor-in-Chief of the Arkansas
Law Review and first in his
graduating class. He was admit-
ted to the Arkansas bar in 1968. In
1969 he received an LL.M. and in
1971 an S.J.D., both from Harvard
Law School where he was a
Teaching Fellow in Law in 1969.
He has taught law at a number of
American universities and in 1978
was a member of the Law Faculty
of Cambridge University. He is
presently a professor of Law and
History at the University of
Pennsylvania where he served as
vice president of the University
from 1979 to 1981. In 1982 he was
elected state chairman of the Ar-
kansas Republican Party and the
same year was appointed special
chief justice of the Supreme Court
of Arkansas.
Though this list is long, it has not
exhausted the list of Arkansas Ar-
nold lawyers. John H. Arnold, Wil-
liam Hendrick Arnold's first
ME
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cousin, was born in 1864, read law
in the Prescott firm of Smoote &
McRae, and was admitted to the
bar of Arkansas in 1884. He later
moved to Washington, Arkansas,
where he became mayor and a
member of the firm of Williams
and Williams. He died in 1925. Fi-
nally, W.H. (Dub) Arnold prosecu-
ting attorney in Arkadelphia, is a
distant cousin.
The Arnolds have been practic-
ing law in southwest Arkansas for
one hundred and two years. With
eleven of them having been admit-
ted to the Arkansas bar, the Ar-
nolds have one of the longest and
fullest family legal traditions in
the state. 0]
NOTES
1. W. H. Arnold. The Arnold Family 22
(1935).
2. Id. at 171.
3. Id. at 184.
4. Id. at 173.
5. Id. at 173-74.
6. Id. at 185.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 186.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 188.
11. Id.
The Arkansas Court
of Appeals
On November 7, 1978, the voters
of the State of Arkansas approved
Amendment 58 to the Arkansas
Constitution, which provided for
the creation of the Arkansas Court
of Appeals.2 The impetus for the
new court had come from members
of the Arkansas Supreme Court
and others in the legal profession
who argued that the state's judi-
cial system, and specifically the
Supreme Court, would suffer with-
out it. Proponents argued that the
new court would reduce the Su-
preme Court's workload, allow
judges more time to consider cases
and write opinions, and make the
appellate process quicker and
more efficient.3
Because the creation of the Court
of Appeals brought about such a
dramatic change in the Arkansas
judicial structure, requiring the
expenditure of a substantial por-
tion of state funds,' the general
public, as well as the members of
the bar, have a right to know
whether the change has been a
beneficial one.
This study was undertaken as an
attempt to determine whether the
projected benefits have accrued,
and what effects, if any, the crea-
Editor's Note: James D. Ginger-
ich is University Counsel and as-
sistant professor of Political Sci-
ence at the University of Central
Arkansas. He is a 1980 graduate of
the University of Arkansas School
of Law in Fayetteville. He received
his L.L.M. in 1982 from the Univer-
sity of Bristol, England.
This article is a condensed ver-
sion of a paper which won top hon-
ors at the February meeting of the
Arkansas Political Science As-
sociation in Jonesboro.
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WAS IT
WORTH THE
TROUBLE?'
By James D. Gingerich
tion of the court has had on the
Supreme Court. Several factors
were chosen to measure changes
in the Supreme Court during the
years immediately preceding and
following the creation of the Court
of Appeals. The results of those
measurements were then
analyzed to determine the nature
and extent of the effect, and
whether the new court has
achieved those things which were
expected of it.
I. The Creation of the
Court of Appeals
At one time, the workload of the
Arkansas Supreme Court was very
stable. In 1964, a total of 464 cases
were disposed of by the court.' In
1970, that number had risen to 716'
and by 1976, they totaled a stag-
gering 1037 cases-an increase of
123% in only 12 years.7 The earliest
appeals for help came from within
the membership of the Supreme
Court. In his 1976 annual report to
the Governor and General Assem-
bly, then Chief Justice Carleton
Harris wrote:
Justices of the Supreme Court
wrote an average of over 73
opinions each in 1976 as com-
pared with an average of 65
during 1975, substantially above
the national averages for states
without an intermediate ap-
peallate court. Total workload of
the Court increased by almost 30
per cent during 1976 as com-
pared with 1975. Despite the
heavy workload, the Court re-
mains current, but it will be dif-
ficult for the Court to keep pace
with its skyrocketing workload
in the years to come unless help
in the form of an intermediate
appellate court for Arkansas is
forthcoming.(8)
The same theme was echoed in
civic meetings and legislative
committee hearings in subsequent
months by other members of the
Court, educators, and legal practi-
tioners. These efforts realized suc-
cess in March of 1977, when the
Arkansas General Assembly ap-
proved Senate Resolution 5,
which allowed the proposal to be
placed on the ballot in the 1978
general election. By more than a
two-to-one margin,8 the proposal
was approved by voters as
Amendment 58 to the Arkansas
Constitution.
The amendment itself was not
very specific. It simply provided
that the General Assembly was
empowered to create a court of ap-
peals with such "jurisdiction as the
Supreme Court shall by rule
determine." All provisions con-
cerning the number of judges,
method of election, length of term,
method of selecting the chief
judge, and issues relating to
salaries and staff support were left
to the Legislature.
This lack of specificity led to an
intense debate, especially in legal
circles, concerning the legislation
to implement the amendment. In a
vote in January of 1979, the House
of Delegates of the Arkansas Bar
Association was closely divided
over the bill which was then being
debated before the General As-
sembly. The most controversial
provisions concerned the six-
person composition of the court,
which could lead to evenly split
decisions, and the selection of the
chief judge by the chief justice of
the Supreme Court." The legis-
lators, after lengthy discussions
and several amendments, eventu-
ally enacted Act 208 of 1979, includ-
ing both of those provisions. On
July 7, 1979, Governor Bill Clinton
appointed the court's first mem-
bers12 and its first opinions were
handed down one month later.
II. Measurements
and Expectations
When the creation of the Court of
Appeals was being debated, pro-
ponents argued that the following
benefits would result- (1) the work-
load of the Supreme Court would
be decreased; (2) the Supreme
Court would be able to hear only
the more "serious', cases, have
more time to decide them, and
consequently, write "better" opin-
ions; (3) the appellate process
would become quicker and more
efficient; and (4) duplications in
the appellate process would be
avoided. In order to measure
whether these benefits have ac-
crued, nine criteria were selected
as measurement tools. Supreme
Court decisions over a seven year
period, from 1976-1982, were
studied. 3 The criteria selected,
and the reason for their selection,
are as follows:
Workload
Two criteria were selected to
measure changes in the workload
of the Supreme Court. The first was
the number of cases which were
disposed of during each term. In-
cluded in the figures were all ap-
peals, petitions, and motions
(other than motions for an exten-
sion of time) considered by the
court which were finally disposed
of during the term. The second
criteria selected was the total
number of majority opinions writ-
ten each year, denominated into a
per-justice average.
If the Court of Appeals has pro-
duced the desired result, the
number of dispositions and ma-
jority opinions should decrease
after the 1979 term.
More Time to Consider Cases,
Write "Better" Opinions
The objective of allowing jus-
tices more time to consider and
write opinions is that it will allow
time for additional research,
thought, drafting, and, in the end,
produce a "better" opinion. The
problem, of course, is in develop-
ing a set of criteria to measure the
quality of an opinion which ex-
cludes, as much as possible, the
introduction of large amounts of
subjectivity.
In an attempt to avoid this prob-
lem, a method similar to that used
by Roger Groot in his study of the
North Carolina courts" was
adopted. With Groot's method,
there is no direct attempt to deter-
mine whether the quality of the
opinion has improved, but simply
to note those changes which would
indicate that additional time has
been put into the opinion writing
task.
Thus, four criteria were selected
for measurement. The first two in-
volve the average number of
concurring and dissenting opin-
ions written by each justice. In a
system in which a justice is over-
worked and pressed for time, it is
reasonable to assume that if he
agreed with the result reached by
the majority, he would join the
opinion even though he disagreed
with the reasoning used. Likewise,
a justice who disagreed with the
result of the majority would issue
an opinion in only those cases in
which he possessed very strong
feelings. In both instances, with
more time available to develop
and formulate his own reasoning,
a justice would be more likely to
express it. Thus, it should be ex-
pected that the number of concur-
ring and dissenting opinions
would increase after the creation
of the Court of Appeals.
A third criterion studied con-
cerns the length of opinions. With
more time available to do research
and develop and expand lines of
reasoning, the length of the jus-
tices' opinions should increase.
Thus, if proponents were correct in
their projections, one would expect
the number of pages per opinion to
increase after 1979.
Finally, the number of per
curium opinions was studied. If
the appellate courts are properly
structured so that the Supreme
Court hears only the more impor-
tant cases, the number of those
cases disposed of with per cirium
opinions should decrease. In addi-
tion, with more time to consider
cases, those which would have
previously resulted in a per curium
order could be handled with a full
opinion. Thus, if the Court of Ap-
peals has had the desired effect,
the number of per curium opinions
should decrease after 1979.
Make the Appellate Process
Quicker and More Efficient
The obvious method of determin-
ing whether the appellate process
requires less time is to count the
average number of days cases are
before the cour c. The Arkansas Jud-
icial Department has been track-
ing selected cases through the
courts for several years, and their
findings are used here for this pur-
pose. The time measured begins
on the day in which the record is
filed with the Supreme Court and
ends on the day when the decision
is rendered. It should be expected
that the amount of time will de-
crease following the creation of the
Court of Appeals.
As to the court's efficiency, this
criterion is usually determined by
measuring its currency, that is, the
number of cases which are dis-
posed of within the term as com-
pared to the number of cases
which are filed. With a smaller
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workload, it should be expected
that the disposition ratio of the
court will increase after 1979.
Avoid Duplication of Appeals
The final benefit noted by the
Court of Appeals' proponents was
that the structure of the court
would insure that duplication in
the appellate process would be
avoided. The only way a case once
heard by the Court of Appeals may
reach the Supreme Court is by a
grant of certiorari. In order to as-
sess the success of this structure,
the number of petitions for review
granted by the Supreme Court
were compared to the total number
of cases disposed of by the Court of
Appeals. If the proponents were
correct, only a very small percen-
tage of the cases disposed of
should have been accepted for re-
view by the Supreme Court.
III. Findings and Analysis 5
1. Dispositions. At first glance,
there seems to be a little change in
the number of Supreme Court dis-
positions before and after the crea-
tion of the Court of Appeals (See
Table 1). In 1976, there were 1037
cases disposed of, rising to 1234 in
1979. By 1982, the number of dis-
positions had dropped to 1062,16 a
decline of only 14%
WORKLOAD AS MEASURED BY
NUMBER OF DISPOSITIONS
ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT, 1976-1982
Non-Time
Year Appeals Petition. Motions Total
1976 551 186 300 1037
1977 576 190 268 1034
1978 585 203 282 1070
1979 657 244 333 1234
1980 512 312 398 1222
1981 468 208 384 1060
1982 437 224 401 1062
Table 1
The figures are more enlighten-
ing, however, when compared to
the number of dispositions which
would have resulted had the Court
of Appeals not been created. Since
the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court prior to the creation of the
Court of Appeals is basically the
same as that presently shared by
the two courts,' 7 an indication of
what the Supreme Court's work-
load would have been can be
made by adding the workload of
the two courts. The number of dis-
positions for the Court of Appeals
is found in Table 2. In 1982 had
these cases been added to the
workload of the Supreme Court,
they would have totaled 1754
cases. As compared to the actual
workload of 1062 cases, this is a
real decline of 1692 cases, or 61%
(See Table 3). Thus, it can be seen
that the creation of the Court of
Appeals has had a significant ef-
fect on the decline in the number of
dispositions by the Supreme
Court.
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WORKLOAD AS MEASURED BY
NUMBER OF DISPOSITIONS
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS, 1979-1982
Non-Time
Your Appeals Petitions Motions Total
1979 226 96 93 415
1980 905 158 284 1347
1981 886 178 361 1425
1982 1062 164 466 1692
Table 2
2. Number of Majority Opinions.
A look at the average number of
published opinions per justice
provides further evidence of the
Supreme Court's decreasing work-
load. From a high of 77 majority
opinions per justice in 1978, the
average had dropped 41% to 45
opinions in 1982 (See Table 4). This
decline is even more dramatic
when it is considered that the
number of actual cases disposed of
NUMBER OF DISPOSITIONS IN SUPREME COURT
AND COURT OF APPEALS, 1976-1982 The shaded area repre-
e Court sents the difference be-
Appel tween the Supreme Court's
Appeals actual workload and the
othCourte workload which would
have resulted had not the
Court of Appeals been
created. -*A
/
/
/
I
/
/
/
I
I I I
1976 1977 1978
Table 3
I I I I
1979 1980 1981 1982
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I
in the Supreme Court alone had
remained fairly constant. This can
be explained by the fact that the
percentage of cases disposed of
with a written opinion has steadily
declined (See Table 5). This de-
cline is largely a result of the de-
creasing number of appeals taken
to the Supreme Court, which are
more likely to be disposed of with
a written opinion than are peti-
tions and motions (See Table I).
The largest decline is from 1979 to
1980, a direct result of the effects
of the Court of Appeals. Thus It
appears that the creation of the
court has produced the desired
result of decreasing the workload
of the Supreme Court.
NUMBER OF WRITTEN OPINIONS
AS PERCENTAGE OF
TOTAL DISPOSITIONS
ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT 1976-1982
Written
Year Dispositions Opinions Percentage
1976 1037 581 56%
1977 1034 542 52%
1978 1070 634 59%
1979 1234 544 44%
1980 1222 493 40%
1981 1060 439 41%
1982 1062 418 39%
Table 5
3. Frequency of Concurring
Opinions. In the three years pre-
ceding the creation of the Court of
Appeals, the Supreme Court wrote
an average of 16.33 concurring
opinions per year. In the years fol-
lowing the court's creation, that
average increased to 39 opinions
per year (See Table 6). This number
increased even though the total
number of all opinions declined
during the period. The percentage
of all opinions made up of concur-
ring opinions increased from 4% in
1979 to 13% in 1982. Thus, the ex-
pected rise in concurring opinions
after 1979 has, in fact, resulted.
4. Frequency of Dissenting
Opinions. Similarly, the number of
dissenting opinions has increased
over the period (See Table 6). From
1976-1978 the Supreme Court wrote
an average of 52.33 dissenting
opinions per year, representing an
average of 8.66% of the total opin-
ions handed down during the
period. From 1980-1982 the number
had increased to 70 dissenting
per case has declined." In 1976,
the court published 256 opinions
with an average of 4.5 pages per
case (See table 7). By 1982, the
number of published opinions had
increased to 382, but the average
had declined to 3.4 pages per case.
The average has declined each
year since 1979.
One possible explanation exter-
nal to the Court of Appeals which
may account for the decline is re-
lated to the publication of the
court's opinions. It was at one time
a policy of the Supreme Court to
publish only certain types of opin-
ions; those which involved routine
issues or were not useful for refer-
ence purposes were not desig-
nated for publication." In 1979,
this rule was changed to provide
that "all signed opinions of the Su-
preme Court shall be. designated
for publication. Prior to 1979, there-
fore, many opinions which resol-
ved routine issues, and thus were
more likely to be shorter opinions,
were not published; whereas, fol-
lowing 1979, all cases were in-
cluded.
NUMBER OF MAJORITY, DISSENTING. AND CONCURRING OPINIONS
ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT, 1978-1982
Dissenting in Part and
Year Majority Op. Dissenting Op. Concurring Op. Concurring in Part Total#__%# %#_#__
1976 509 88% 55 9%0 11 2% 6 1% 581
1977 488 90% 37 7% 14 3% 3 0% 542
1978 539 85% 65 10% 24 4% 6 1% 634
1979 453 83% 62 11% 23 4% 6 1% 544
1980 352 71% 95 19% 35 7% 11 2% 493
1981 327 74% 79 18% 26 6%17 2% 439
1982 318 76% 36 9% 56 130/ 8 2% 418
Table 6
opinions per year, an average of
15.33% of the total opinions.
5. Number of Pages Per Opinion.
If the Supreme Court had declining
workloads and additional time to
consider cases, it is reasonable to
expect that the length of opinions
issued by the court would in-
crease. The evidence, however,
indicates that the number of pages
6. Number of Per Curium Opin-
ions. Other than to note that the
number of per curium opinions
rose dramatically in 1982, it is dif-
ficult to draw any conclusions from
the figures. The percentage of per
curium opinions decreased in the
years preceding the Court of Ap-
peals, then began to rise slowly
until 1982 (See Table 8). The
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WORKLOAD AS MEASURED BY NUMBER OF WRITTEN OPINIONS
ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT. 1976-1982
# Maj. Ave. Per # Other Ave. Per All Ave. Per
Year Opinions Justice Opinions Justice Opinions Justice
1976 509 73 72 10 581 83
1977 488 70 54 8 542 77
1978 539 77 95 14 634 91
1979 453 65 91 13 544 78
1980 352 50 141 20 493 70
1981 327 47 112 16 439 63
1982 318 45 100 14 418 60
Table 4
expectation was that they would
decrease after 1979. It may be that
the increasing percentage of the
Supreme Court's workload made
up by petitions and motions, as
opposed to appeals (See Table 1)
has increased the use of per
curiums. The number of appeals
decreased 21% from 1976 to 1982,
whereas the number of petitions
and motions increased about 29%
during the same period. Even if
this could be shown, however, it
would not account for the dramatic
increase of per curiums in 1982.
NUMBER OF PAGES PER CASE*
ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT, 1978-1982
Year Cases Paes. P/C
1976 256 1159 4.5
1977 275 1102 4.0
1978 333 1367 4.1
1979 371 1626 4.4
1980 367 1515 4.1
1981 375 1300 3.5
1982 382 1288 3.4
Table 7
Includes all opinions written and published by
the Supreme Court, including per curium opin-
ions.
PER CURIUM OPINIONS
ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT 1978-1982
Number Number
Year Per Curiums Total Opinions %
1976 43 624 7%
1977 28 570 5%
1978 16 650 2%
1979 16 560 3%
1980 22 515 4%
1981 46 485 9%
1982 106 524 20/0
Table 8
7. Number of Days in Appellate
Court. The results of the survey
concerning the average length of
time a case is before the Supreme
Court are somewhat mixed. The
average time for all cases actually
rose substantially from 1979 to
1980--from 173.5 days to 196.5 days
(See Table 9). The average has
steadily declined since reaching
its lowest point during the seven
years in 1982 with an average of
149,5 days.
While the average time for all
cases has increased, that increase
is solely attributable to the in-
creased time to hear criminal
cases. The average time for civil
cases has declined each year since
1979. This added time to hear crim-
inal cases is no doubt a result of
the change in the Supreme Court's
criminal jurisdiction. While the
court was hearing all criminal
cases before the creation of the
Court of Appeals, it now hears only
the most serious criminal cases in-
volving a sentence of death, life
imprisonment, or at least 30 years
imprisonment. The more substan-
tial issues, especially in capital
cases, have increased the amount
of time these cases are before the
court. As a result, the Court of Ap-
peals has not had the immediate
result of decreasing the amount of
time a case is before the Supreme
Court. AVERAGE TIME CASE IS
BEFORE APPELLATE COURT*
ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT 1978-1982
Ave. Ave. Ave.
Civil Criminal An
Year Cases Cases Cases
1976 181 146 163.5
1977 178 137 157.5
1978 173 150 161.5
1979 201 146 173.5
1980 184 209 196.5
1981 177 188 182.5
1982 146 153 149.5
Table 9
Figures are based upon a yearly survey of cases
by the Judicial Department of Arkansas. All
cases in which there was a written majority
opinion are included in the survey. Per curiums,
cases transferred pursuant to Rule 29, cases
dismissed without opinions, and exceptional
cases which tend to skew the statistical objec-
tive of the survey were not included.
8. Currency. With the currency
level of over 100% in the calendar
year preceding the creation of the
Court of Appeals, it is difficult to
expect that level to be improved. In
fact, the disposition ratio in-
creased to 110.57% in 1979, drop-
ped to 95.39% in 1980, and then re-
turned to above the 100% level in
1981 and 1982 (See Table 10). Be-
cause the Supreme Court did such
an admirable job of remaining cur-
rent despite a pressing workload
before its creation, it is difficult to
tell if the Court of Appeals has had
any effect.
DISPOSITION RATIO (CURRENCY)
ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT 1977-1982*
Number Number Disposition
Year Filings Dispositions Rate
1977 1086 1034 95.21
1978 1012 1070 105.73
1979 1116 1234 110.57
1980 1281 1222 95.39
1981 1021 1060 103.81
1992 979 1062 108.47
Table 10
Figures for 1976 were not available,
9. Number of Petitions for Re-
view Granted. The last general
goal stated by the proponents of
the Court of Appeals was to insure
that the court did not slow down or
complicate the appellate process
by allowing a system of "dual" ap-
peals. Dr. Robert Leflar, one of the
leading figures in the court's es-
tablishment, suggested that "3 or 4
percent is too large, of the cases
decided by the intermediate court,
[to] go on to the Supreme Court."' 2
The figures indicate that the sys-
tem has easily met that goal. In the
first six months of the Court of Ap-
peals' existence, 8 cases, or 2% of
the court's 415 total dispositions,
were heard again in the Supreme
Court (See Table 11). The per-
centage has decreased each year
so that by 1982, only .3% (5 of 1692)
of the Court of Appeal cases were
accepted for review.
PETITIONS FOR REVIEW GRANTED
ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT 1979-1982
Number- Total
Petitions Dispositions In
Year Granted Court of Appeals %
1979 8 415 2%
1980 15 1347 1%
1981 9 1425 .6%
1982 5 1692 .3%
Table 11
IV. Conclusion
From this analysis, it can be
concluded that the insertion of the
Court of Appeals into the Arkansas
appellate structure has been
largely successful. Most of the
benefits which were projected by
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the court's proponents have, in
fact, resulted. The decrease in the
workload of the Supreme Court,
during a time in which the number
of appeals from lower courts has
increased dramatically, has re-
lieved the court of a tremendous
burden. The substantial decrease
in the number of majority opinions
written per justice and the increas-
ing frequency of concurring and
dissenting opinions suggest that
justices now have more time
available to consider cases. In ad-
dition, the court continues to be
one of the most efficient in the Un-
ited States.
The success of the new system Is
due largely to the unique structure
of the two courts. By providing
each court with its own separate
jurisdiction, the largest possible
number of appeals can be proces-
sed and the problem of having
"dual" appeals is avoided.
One of the goals which has not
been so successfully met involves
the nature of the cases heard by
the Supreme Court. While the rule
providing for the division of the
two appellate courts' jurisdiction
was intended to allow the Su-
preme Court to hear only the more
important cases and issues of
some serious legal significance,
recent additions to that juris-
diction have been made solely to
effectuate a balance between the
number of cases filed in the two
courts. Thus in many instances,
the cases heard by the Supreme
Court are no more important than
those heard by the Court of
appeals-they are merely diffe-
rent. One might argue that what
results is an appellate system hav-
ing two supreme courts. However,
so long as the Supreme Court re-
tains the right to review cases
heard by the Court of Appeals, it
remains the "supreme" court, and
any dilution of its jurisdiction is
more than outweighed by the ad-
vantage of smaller workloads and
the resulting quality and effi-
ciency in the appellate process.
From a situation in which bulg-
ing dockets and increasing work-
loads were threatening the integ-
rity of the Arkansas appellate sys-
tem, the Arkansas Court of Appe-
als has emerged to save the day. A
review of the evidence suggests
that its creation has had a positive
effect on the Supreme Court and
accomplished those things which
were expected of it. With the Su-
preme Court's ability to constantly
monitor the workload between the
two courts, to make necessary ad-
justments, and to exercise control
over those cases which are ac-
cepted for review from the Court of
Appeals, the work product, effi-
ciency, and effectiveness of the
Supreme Court and the Arkansas
judicial system should continue to
improve in the years to come. 0
FOOTNOTES
This is a condensed version of a paper
which was presented to the Arkansas
Political Science Association in Jones-
boro, Arkansas in February, 1984.
Amendment 58 provides:
The General Assembly is hereby em-
powered to create and establish a Court
of Appeals and divisions thereof. The
Court of Appeals shall have such appel.
late jurisdiction as the Supreme Court
shall by rule determine, and shall be
subject to the general superintending
control of the Supreme Court. Judges of
the Court of Appeals shall have the same
qualifications as justices of the Supreme
Court and shall be selected in the man-
ner provided by law.
Arkansas Gazette, March 4, 1977, §B at 1,
col. 7 and September 2, 1978, §A at 9, col.
1.
In 1982, a total of $1,018,514 was
budgeted for the 1983-84 Fiscal Year for
the salaries and operating expenses of
the Arkansas Court of Appeals.
First Annual Report of Judicial Depart-
ment of Arkansas, [herein cited as An-
nual Report].
1979 Annual Report.
1976 Annual Report.
* Letter from Carleton Harris to David
Pryor, contained in 1976 Annual Report.
Senate Joint Resolution 5, Acts of Arkan-
sas 1977, p. 2431.
20 The official vote totaled 291,941 for the
amendment, 141,792 against the
amendment.
2 Arkansas Gazette, January 21, §A at 9,
col. 1.
22 The first members of the court included
M. Steele Hays, David Newbern, Mrs.
Marian Penix, George Howard, Jr., Ernie
Wright, and James Pilkinton. These
members served until January 1, 1981,
when the first elected members of the
court assumed office. Arkansas Gazette,
July 8, 1979, §A at 1, col. 3.
One problem with the figures which must
be noted is the fact that the personnel of
the court changed during this period.
Three of the justices who were on the
court in 1976 remained in 1982. The extent
to which this change in personnel af-
fected the court is not considered in this
study.
'R R. D. Groot, "The Effects of an Inter-
mediate Appellate Court on the Supreme
Court Work Product; The North Carolina
Experience," 7 Wake Forest Law Review
548, 1971.
2 Unless otherwise noted, all figures were
compiled from the Annual Reports of the
Arkansas Judicial Department for years
1976-1982.
2. The 1982 Annual Report, p. 21, incorrectly
calculates the total dispositions at 928.
This appears to be due to an error in addi-
tion for petitions and motions which is
listed at 491, but actually totaled 625.
2? The only significant change in the Juris-
diction of the court concerned the addi-
tion of appeals from the Employment Se-
curity Division. Originally, these cases
were appealed to the circuit court in the
county where the appellant resided. In
1979, all such appeals were transferred
to the Court of Appeals. Ark. Stat. Ann.
§I 107(dX7) (Repl. 1976). These cases con-
stituted 154 dispositions in 1980, 360 in
1981, and 391 in 1982.
" These figures were compiled from a re-
view of all cases published by the Su-
preme Court for January 1, 1976-De-
cember 31. 1982, contained in volumes
531-644 of the South Western Reporter,
2nd. Series. The figures used for each
case include any page on which any part
of the case appeared.
25 See, Smith, "The Selective Publication of
Opinions: One Court's Experience," 32
Ark. L. Rev. 26 (1978) and Newbern and
Wilson, "Rule 21: Unprecedent and the
Disappearing Court," 32 Ark. L. Rev. 37
(1978).
80 Arkansas Supreme Court Rules, rule
21.1.
"2 Arkansas Gazette, September 2, 1978 §A
at 9, col. 1.
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BULLETIN
ABA Model Rules on Professional Conduct:
An Update
I
By Herschel H. Friday
On August 2, 1983, after more
than six (6) years of study and hear-
ings, the American Bar Associa-
tion House of Delegates approved
a new set of rules governing the
professional conduct of lawyers. If
history repeats itself, these rules
will ultimately be adopted sub-
stantially intact in most of the
states. Certain states have al-
ready taken action.
State bars or bar associations in
Pennsylvania, New Jersey and
Michigan have recommendations
for the adoption of the Model Rules
in their new format pending before
their supreme courts. In Pennsyl-
vania a court-ordered comment
period was expired and the Model
Rules themselves and the State
Bar Association's recommenda-
tions have been referred to the Dis-
ciplinary Board for final comment.
The State Bar of Maryland's Board
of Governors is expected to ap-
prove a final version of its commit-
tee's report in time to make a rec-
ommendation to its Court of Appe-
als in May.
Arizona's high court is
scheduled to receive a recommen-
dation from their state bar shortly,
and Montana and Kansas will re-
port to their high courts in April
and June, respectively. The state of
Virginia had adopted a new Code
of Professional responsibility in
October, 1983, having used the
Model Rules as a starting point
and adopting certain substantive
portions of the Rules, but adhering
to the Model Code format.
In most of the other states there
are committees in existence
charged with the responsibility of
guiding the rules through the
necessary educational and adop-
tion processes.
The committee in Arkansas
(created by the Arkansas Bar As-
sociation) consists of Philip Ander-
son, John F. Stroud, Jr., H. William
Allen, Howard W. Brill, Jack De-
acon, John Fogleman, John Gill,
Jerry W. Cavaneau, Richard N.
Moore, Jr. and Herschel H. Friday,
chair. We are holding meetings
and making presentations to vari-
ous bar associations and in-
terested groups and will present a
program at the Annual Meeting of
the Arkansas Bar Association in
Hot Springs on Thursday, June 7,
1984. We have not seen fit to set a
rigid timetable but will proceed as
diligently as possible.
The new rules contain a total of
eight categories and 52 individual
rules as follows:
Number
Category of Rules
Client-Lawyer Relationship .... 16
Counselor ..................... 3
Advocate ...................... 9
Transactions with Persons
Other than Clients ........... 4
Law Firms and Associations .... 6
Public Service ................. 4
Information About
Legal Services ............... 5
Maintaining the Integrity of
the Profession ............... S
I think it is fair to say that most of
the criticisms of earlier drafts have
been answered. There remains in
the minds of some lawyers and
laymen (as has always been the
case) doubts about the rules that
deal with certain historically con-
troversial subjects (particularly
confidentialy and other aspects of
client-lawyer relationships, some
subjects dealt with rules in the ad-
vocate category and the varying
but deliberate use of both manda-
tory and permissive language).
Nevertheless, most seem to agree
that the rules represent a com-
prehensive and responsible effort
to keep the governing standards
for professional conduct of lawyers
abreast of the times and most like
the new restatement format. I urge
each of you to take the time to read
and study the proposed Model
Rules and contact our Committee
with any suggestions or comments
which you may have. 0
. qod'man & .Ctdo.ai, l.
CHEMICAL CONSULTANTS
* PRODUCT AND PROCESS LIABILITY CASES,
* TOXIC SUBSTANCES (PESTICIDES, HAZARDOUS WASTE,
AND TRANSPORTATION).
* CONTRABAND DRUG ANALYSIS AND BLOOD ALCOHOL
ANALYSIS. RANDOM AND ACCIDENT RELATED DRUG
SCREENING
* TOXICITY OF CHEMICALS AND WASTES (TOSCA, EPA,
NIOSH-REG, OSHA)
• MARINE AND OFFSHORE LITIGATIONS INVOLVING
PETROLEUM, CHEMICALS, AND HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS
-OFFSHORE PERSONAL INJURY, EXPLOSIONS-FIRES
* SLIP AND FALL LITIGATIONS (COEFFICIENT OF FRICTION
INSTRUMENTS)
* PLASTICS AND NON-METALLIC FAILURES
* LABORATORY ANALYSIS FACILITIES (CHEMICAL, BIO-
CHEMICAL, DRUGS AND METALLURGICAL)
• CONSULTANTS TO INDUSTRY, INSURANCE CO'S, AND
LEGAL PROFESSION
• EXPERT WITNESS APPEARANCES
P.O. Box 8777 (504) 831-7695
Metalrle, LA 70001 488-5518
454-0774 (24 hours)
392-7961
PLEASE WRITE FOR OUR BROCHURE
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